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Abstract
Online communities provide a social sphere for people to share information and
knowledge. While information sharing is becoming a ubiquitous online phenomenon,
how to ensure information quality or induce quality content, however, remains a chal-
lenge due to the anonymity of commentators. This paper introduces moderation into
reputation systems. We show that moderation directly impacts strategic commenta-
tors incentive to generate useful information, and moderation is generally desirable to
improve information quality. Interestingly, we find that when being moderated with
different probabilities based on their reputations, commentators may display a pat-
tern of reputation oscillation, in which they generate useful content to build up high
reputation and then exploit their reputation. As a result, the expected performance
from high-reputation commentators can be inferior to that from low-reputation ones
(reversed reputation). We then investigate the optimal moderation resource allocation,
and conclude that the seemingly abnormal reversed reputation could arise as an opti-
mal result. The paper concludes with a discussion of the development of a scientific
moderation system with application to academic publishing.
Keywords: moderation, reputation, online community, knowledge management
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1 Introduction
The rise of social computing and online communities has ushered in a new era of content
delivery, where information can be easily shared and accessed (Parameswaran and Whinston,
2007). A large number of applications have emerged that facilitate collective actions for
content generation and knowledge sharing. Examples include blogs, online product reviews,
wiki applications such as Wikipedia.com, and online forums such as slashdot.org. Due to the
anonymity of Internet users, however, how to ensure information quality or induce quality
content remains a challenge. To deal with that, this paper introduces a moderation system
and examines its effect on the content quality of online communities.
Information sharing and user-generated content have become ubiquitous online phenom-
ena. For example, Wikipedia, a free online encyclopedia, is dedicated to massive distributed
collaboration by “allow[ing] visitors to add, remove, edit and change content.”1 In online
product reviews, like the ones on Amazon.com, any user can post reviews on any item, even
if he or she has not bought it on Amazon. Online forums such as Slashdot are another
example. Slashdot, a website that supports discussions on user-submitted news stories and
articles related to technology, is one of the most frequently visited sites on the Internet.
On Slashdot, all users can express their opinions simply by posting the comment under a
selected topic.
As these applications have gained popularity and importance, the quality of content has
become a concern. In Wikipedia, readers may be provided with content that is misleading
or even incorrect. Product reviews on Amazon can be manipulated by sellers or book pub-
lishers to boost their products. On Slashdot, commentators may post some biased or useless
comments; e.g., advertisers from hardware companies may post biased comments to promote
their products. Wikipedia is still experimenting with different approaches to ensure the qual-
ity of content. As one of its co-founders pointed out, Wikipedia, as an encyclopedia, lacks
both the usual review process and the respect for expertise of most encyclopedias.2 Amazon
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki
2http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2004/12/30/142458/25
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has introduced a voting system, in which consumers can vote on whether a particular review
is helpful, and the vote result affects the continued ranking of that review. Voting mitigates
the information manipulation problem, but it has its pitfalls, since the voting process itself
can be manipulated.
Slashdot has constructed a reputation system and has been recognized for its quality of
content, unlike many other social networks. On Slashdot, commentators develop reputations
based on the quality of their past comments.3 Each comment posted by a commentator
receives a score ranging from −1 to 5, indicating the quality of the comment. Comments’
default scores differ from each other according to the commentators’ reputations. Once a
comment is posted, it may be checked or “moderated” by selected users who can change its
score and assign a label, such as “informative” or “redundant.” This feedback affects the
comment’s score and the commentator’s reputation. Slashdot selects moderators randomly
from among eligible users, and limits the moderator status both in number of posts to be
moderated (five) and in time (three days). This restriction ensures no moderator can have
an undue effect on the system.4
Similar moderation processes have been adopted by other online communities, such as
www.kuro5hin.org and www.plastic.com. In fact, the moderation process was introduced
mainly to screen information. As stated by one of Slashdot’s founders, “The purpose of
moderation is to help people organize information;” it can help users “pick up hidden gems
on the sandy beach of comments” (Chromatic et al., 2002). However, it seems the actual
impact of moderation is more extensive. In particular, the refined review process could have
a significant effect on commentators’ incentive to generate quality content.
Introducing moderation to online communities shows promise for ensuring content qual-
ity. However, little research in information systems has been done to study the effect of
3Slashdot uses “karma” points to measure commentators’ reputations. Karma points or reputations are
clustered into a small set of labels (e.g., terrible, bad, positive, excellent). Commentators can change their
karma points by posting comments of quality or performing other community activity.
4To enhance the moderation system, Slashdot introduces a meta-moderation mechanism, where readers
can volunteer to review the fairness of moderators’ decisions. These reviews may affect a moderator’s Karma,
which in turn influences the chance that the moderator will be chosen as a moderator in the future.
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moderation or the design of a moderation system. As a starting point, this paper examines
the impact of moderation on the performance of an online community. We consider a com-
munity consisting of both dedicated and opportunistic commentators. The former behave
altruistically, while the latter behave strategically. Commentators possess their reputations
in the community and post their comments of different quality. A moderation system mod-
erates each comment. The moderation result impacts both a comment’s readership and the
commentator’s reputation.
We start with a simple case in which the moderation system monitors comments from
commentators with different reputations with the same frequency. We find that moderation
has a direct impact on the opportunistic types’ incentive to exert effort. When adequate
moderation is applied, opportunistic users always exert effort regardless of their reputations,
whereas if moderation is very limited, they may exert no effort at all. When the level
of moderation is in the middle, commentators may adopt a strategy mixing exertion and
no exertion. It is also demonstrated that a reputation system that includes moderation is
superior to a pure reputation system in terms of the expected performance of the community.
We also consider differentiated moderation probabilities for different reputations. We
find that when the moderation system monitors low-reputation commentators more care-
fully, commentators may display reputation oscillation. In particular, they work hard to
generate useful information for building up a high reputation in one period and then exploit
it in the next. In this case, interestingly, the expected performance from high-reputation
commentators can be inferior to that from low-reputation ones, which again illustrates the
critical impact of moderation on commentators’ incentives.
Finally, we discuss the optimal moderation resource allocation issues. We find that when
the moderation resource is costly, optimal moderation involves either equally moderating all
commentators or moderating low-reputation commentators only. In other words, it is never
optimal to monitor high-reputation commentators more closely.
As information quality has been identified as an important factor in the success of infor-
mation systems (DeLone and McLean, 1992), the quality of content is a natural concern for
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online communities. A large volume of the existing literature focuses on reputation systems.
For example, Dellarocas (2005) has studied the reputation mechanism in eBay-like trading
environments, with a focus on how mechanism parameters (e.g., a user’s feedback profile)
impact sellers’ effort levels and market efficiency. The study on reputation in economics can
be traced back several decades. In their seminal work, Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Mil-
grom and Roberts (1982) concluded that reputation effects arise with even a small amount
of incomplete information on agents’ types. Later, Cripps et al. (2004) showed that with
imperfect monitoring, reputation cannot be sustained infinitely – if a long-run player stays
in the game long enough, short-run players will eventually learn the long-run’s true type and
the game will inevitably revert to one of the static Nash equilibrium. In contrast to well-
understood reputation systems, the moderation system has attracted little notice. Lampe
and Resnick (2004) document some observations of the moderation practice and point out
that “important challenges remain for designers of such systems.” Our paper tries to build
up a game-theoretic model to analyze commentators’ incentives and study the impact of
moderation, and aims to address why moderation works and how it can be improved.
Study of online communities also has been concerned with users’ motivation for their
voluntarily participation in and contribution to communities. Based on their data, Wasko
and Faraj (2005) find several factors related to users’ motivation to contribute, such as the
perception of enhancing their professional reputations. Bateman et al. (2006) study this
issue, drawing on organizational commitment theory. Benabou and Tirole (2006) develop a
theory of prosocial behavior to systematically explain this motivation issue. They attribute
the individuals’ motivation to the intrinsic value, monetary benefit, and reputation effect
derived from the participation. Our paper assumes that two different types of commentators,
the dedicated type and the opportunistic type, participate in online communities for their
own reasons. The former may be driven by intrinsic value, whereas the latter pursues
monetary benefit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out our model. We
analyze the equilibrium effort choice under the same moderation probabilities in section 3
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and under differentiated moderation probabilities in section 4. In section 5, we investigate
the optimal moderation resource allocation. Some extensions and discussion are offered in
section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
We consider an online community in an infinite-period horizon, in which a large number
of commentators post comments and develop reputations in doing so. At the beginning of
each period, the commentators post their comments, and the comments are moderated at
some point within that period. At the end of the period, the commentators’ reputations are
updated based on the perceived quality of their comments as determined by the moderation.
For simplicity, we assume that comments are available to readers for the current period only.
We categorize the commentators into two different types: dedicated and opportunistic.
Dedicated types always post their true opinions and behave like altruists. This would be
because they derive a great deal of intrinsic value from the community and are thus dedi-
cated to the community posting. Due to the heterogeneity in the commentators’ knowledge,
some of their comments are useful, whereas others may be worthless. We assume that the
proportion of useful comments is s. In contrast, opportunistic types behave strategically.
They can exert effort (e = 1) to generate a useful comment, or exert no effort (e = 0) to post
a worthless comment. Exerting effort incurs cost c. Cost c can be interpreted as the time
commentators spend in properly organizing their opinions or investigating the topic under
discussion. We normalize the population size to 1 and assume the proportion of dedicated
commentators is µ, and hence the proportion of the opportunistic type is (1− µ).
A moderation system moderates the quality of comments and labels a verified comment
as useful or worthless. With probability α, a comment is moderated immediately after it
is posted; otherwise, the comment is moderated at the end of the period. We term the
former as early moderation or moderation, and the latter as late moderation or feedback,
as if consumers report quality feedback after consuming a product. The result of early
moderation affects both the number of readers of the comment and the reputation of the
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corresponding commentator. Late moderation affects commentators’ reputations, but it does
not affect the number of readers of the comment, since the results are revealed at the end of
the period.
A commentator may have a high reputation or a low reputation. We consider the com-
mentator’s reputation is high if the last comment is judged to be useful and low if it is
deemed worthless. Such an assumption imposes little restriction, since the primary purpose
of our reputation system is to deal with opportunistic types’ incentive and the above simple
reputation measure plays an effective sanctioning role (the threat of future punishment). In
fact, as shown by Dellarocas (2005), such a reputation measure “is capable of inducing the
same average levels of cooperation and total surplus as more sophisticated mechanisms.”
We are interested in the impact of the moderation system on opportunistic types’ behav-
ior. We assume opportunistic types derive utility from others reading their comments. In
particular, we assume the utility is linear in the size of readers. The verified useful comments
from early moderation get the maximum readership, normalized to 1, and the verified worth-
less comments from early moderation get 0 readership. For comments with late moderation,
their readership level is equal to the expected likelihood of usefulness or the expected success
rate, which is also termed as the expected performance associated with those comments.
We use subscript i, i ∈ {0, 1}, to indicate one’s reputation (with 1 representing high
reputation), and denote vi as the expected payoff of a commentator with reputation i. Then,
the payoffs of opportunistic types at period t can be formulated as follows.
vt1 = max
e∈{0,1}
αe+ (1− α) rt1 + βevt+11 + β (1− e) vt+10 − ce. (1)
vt0 = max
e∈{0,1}
αe+ (1− α) rt0 + βevt+11 + β (1− e) vt+10 − ce. (2)
where β is a discount factor and rti is the expected success rate of a comment from commen-
tators with reputation i.
We will be concerned with steady states in which rti and v
t
i are independent of time (they,
of course, will depend on the state variable – reputation i). In other words, timing does not
play a role in commentators’ decisions. For this reason, we simply omit the period indicator
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t for our discussion and rewrite the above payoff functions as
vi = max
e∈{0,1}
[αe+ (1− α) ri] + β [ev1 + (1− e) v0]− ce, for i ∈ {0, 1}. (3)
The term in the first square bracket represents the expected payoff from the current-period
readership, and the term in the second square bracket captures the future payoff.
Notice the nature of the dynamic programming in the above payoff function: the current
effort choice affects not only the commentator’s current stage payoff but also his or her future
payoff through the realized reputation. Also, it is worth pointing out that we can treat e as
a continuous variable, since e can also be interpreted as the probability of exerting effort in
our game-theoretic framework.
3 Equilibrium Performance
Moderation probabilities have a critical impact on opportunistic types’ optimal choice. In
this section, we investigate three cases where, in equilibrium, opportunistic types exert effort
definitely, exert no effort definitely, and exert effort with some probability, respectively.
Clearly, the marginal benefit from exerting effort is the probabilistic increase in the
current period payoff (α) and the increase in discounted future payoff (β(v1 − v0)). On the
flip side, exerting effort incurs cost c. The balance between the marginal benefit and the
marginal cost is captured by the first-order derivative of the payoff functions (3),
α + β(v1 − v0)− c, (4)
which determines their equilibrium choice. If the above is positive, which means the marginal
benefit outweighs the marginal cost, the commentator will exert effort. Otherwise, he or she
prefers not to exert effort. It is worth noting that commentators have symmetric incentives
in the sense that if it is optimal for them to exert effort when they possess high reputations,
they also find it optimal when they possess low reputations.
Notice that dedicated types do not behave strategically, and with probability s their
comments are useful regardless of their current reputations. Therefore, a proportion s of
dedicated types possess high reputations.
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3.1 The Equilibrium with Effort
When the probability of early moderation (moderation probability afterwards) is high, op-
portunistic types have high motivation to exert effort; otherwise, their comments would
fail the early moderation and thus receive no readership. More precisely, the equilibrium
with opportunistic types exerting effort requires high moderation probabilities, such that the
marginal benefit outweighs the marginal cost; i.e., α+β(v1− v0)− c ≥ 0. In such equilibria,
opportunistic types exert effort and maintain their high reputations.
According to (3), the opportunistic types’ expected payoffs in equilibrium are5
v1 = (1− α) r1 + α− c+ βv1, and v0 = (1− α) r0 + α− c+ βv1. (5)
The difference between the above expected payoffs, v1 − v0 = (1− α) (r1 − r0), plays a
role in determining opportunistic types’ incentives. Notice that the difference is a function
of the moderation probability. If α = 1, then v1 − v0 = 0, which means that the expected
payoffs are the same under either reputation and this case is reduced to a trivial one. In fact,
α = 1 means each comment will be moderated and the quality will be revealed immediately,
and hence the payoff is solely determined by the moderation result. For this reason, under
α = 1, reputations do not matter to either readers or commentators. We next consider
nontrivial cases with α < 1.
Recall the proportion of dedicated types with high reputations is s. Opportunistic types
all have high reputations when they exert effort. So the size of the population in high
reputations will be µs + (1− µ), consisting of dedicated types (the first term) and oppor-
tunistic types (the second term). Since the success rates of comments are s (dedicated types)
and 1 (opportunistic types), respectively, we can formulate the expected success rate or the
expected performance associated with a high reputation as follows:
r1 =
µss+ (1− µ)
µs+ (1− µ) . (6)
5We can call v0 the equilibrium payoff, imagining that with an arbitrarily small probability ² the mod-
eration makes misjudgement such that opportunistic types are still possible in low reputations even though
they exert effort. For more detailed discussion on imperfect moderation, refer to Section 6.1.
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For low reputations, because they are composed solely of dedicated types, the expected
success rate is simply their expected performance s; i.e., r0 = s. It is easy to see r1 > r0,
implying that high reputations indicate higher expected performance.
Based on the expected payoff functions (5), we can rearrange the first-order derivative as
α [1− β (r1 − s)] + β (r1 − s)− c ≥ 0. (7)
Clearly, the left hand side is increasing in α. In other words, the higher the moderation
probability, the more likely the opportunistic types are to exert effort. Intuitively, increasing
moderation probability means increasing the chance of getting early moderation. This en-
hances the current period benefit from exerting effort because their comments are very likely
to be revealed as valuable immediately and thus to receive the highest readership. Therefore,
a higher moderation probability is more likely than a lower one to induce opportunistic types
to exert effort.
We define αH as the value of α that binds the above inequality (7), which is
αH =
c− β (r1 − s)
1− β (r1 − s) . (8)
Thus, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Under any α ≥ αH , exerting effort can be sustained as an equilibrium.
It is worth noting that when the effort cost c is high enough, such that c ≥ 1 (then
αH ≥ 1), no moderation scheme can induce opportunistic types to exert effort. Recall
that the maximum readership/benefit that commentators can achieve is 1 at each period.
Therefore, when the cost is beyond that, no opportunistic types will exert effort in any cases.
For this reason, we assume that c < 1.
From the definition of αH with the assumption c < 1, α > c is a sufficient condition to
induce opportunistic types to exert high effort. Intuitively, α > c means that the expected
increase in the current period payoff (α) outweighs the marginal cost c, which provides
commentators with adequate incentive to exert effort.
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3.2 The Equilibrium with No Effort
Because dedicated types can have high reputations and low reputations, readers have a
certain expectation about their performance even for the low-reputation commentators. As
a result, opportunistic types may catch a “free ride” on those dedicated types by receiving
some readership while exerting no effort, as long as they are not caught in early moderation.
Thus, when the moderation probability is low enough, the “free-ride” strategy would be
opportunistic types’ best choice. More precisely, when the marginal benefit from exerting
effort is not enough to compensate for the marginal cost, i.e., α − c + β(v1 − v0) < 0,
opportunistic types exert no effort in equilibrium. The equilibrium expected payoff are
v0 = (1− α) r0+βv0 and v1 = (1− α) r1+βv0. Their difference is v1−v0 = (1− α) (r1 − r0).
In this case, opportunistic types maintain low reputations because they exert no effort.
As a result, the high-reputation commentators are composed purely of dedicated types, and
therefore the expected performance is s (as that of dedicated types), i.e., r1 = s. Low-
reputation commentators consist of both dedicated types and opportunistic types. Recall
that a proportion 1 − s of dedicated types is in the low-reputation category with those op-
portunistic types. We formulate the expected performance of low-reputation commentators
as:
r0 =
µ(1− s)s
µ(1− s) + 1− µ. (9)
Substituting r1 and r0 in the first-order derivative and rearranging the terms, we have
α [1− β (s− r0)]− c+ β (s− r0) ≤ 0. (10)
Clearly, the left hand side is increasing in α. In other words, the lower the moderation
probability, the less likely opportunistic types are to exert effort. The intuition is similar to
the earlier case: Decreasing the moderation probability also decreases the marginal benefit
from exerting effort. We define αL as the value of α binding in the above inequality, which
is
αL =
c− β (s− r0)
1− β (s− r0) . (11)
Thus, we can derive the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 Under any α ≤ αL, exerting no effort can be sustained as an equilibrium.
The intuition is as we mentioned at the beginning of this subsection. Opportunistic types
can expect a certain level of readership even if they do not exert any effort, as long as they
do not get caught by early moderation. In this case, the certain level of expectation in the
performance is attributed to the dedicated types, since they always contribute, which pro-
vides opportunistic types a chance to free-ride. When the moderation probability is low and
hence there is only a low chance of getting caught and ending up with nothing, opportunistic
types have a strong incentive to free-ride the dedicated types. So, low moderation, no effort.
However, when the cost of effort is low enough (such that c ≤ β (s− r0) and then αL ≤ 0),
exerting no effort cannot be sustained as an equilibrium, no matter how low the moderation
probability is. This is because when free-riding is expected, the expected readership is also
adjusted to a lower level in equilibrium. Meanwhile, opportunistic types always have the
option to exert effort, join the high-reputation group, and obtain high expected readership.
When the effort cost is very low, the benefit from free-riding will be overcome by the net
benefit from exerting effort. As a result, regardless of how low the moderation probability
is, opportunistic types choose to exert effort.
3.3 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
The above analysis characterizes the opportunistic types’ equilibrium effort choice when the
moderation probability is very high or very low. What will be their equilibrium choice if
the moderation probability is between the two, say αL < α < αH?
6 In such cases, we can
speculate that in equilibrium some opportunistic types may exert effort, whereas others do
not, or they sometimes exert effort but other times do not. This involves mixed strategy
equilibria.
For a mixed strategy (between exerting effort and not exerting effort) to arise in equi-
librium, opportunistic types must be indifferent about exerting effort or not – otherwise
6Technically speaking, αL > αH may occur. In that case, multi equilibria exist for a certain range of
moderation probabilities.
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they could always go with the more profitable option. So the marginal benefit balances the
marginal cost in equilibrium, i.e., α+β(v1−v0)−c = 0. We consider a symmetric case where
opportunistic types exert effort with probability m in each reputation.7 In such a case, the
difference in expected payoffs associated with high and low reputations is again equal to the
difference in the current period payoff; i.e., v1 − v0 = (1 − α)(r1 − r0) (refer to (3)). The
proportion of opportunistic types with high reputations will bem. Then, we can characterize
the expected performance under high reputation and low reputation, respectively, as
r1 =
µss+ (1− µ)mm
µs+ (1− µ)m , (12)
r0 =
µ (1− s) s+ (1− µ) (1−m)m
µ (1− s) + (1− µ) (1−m) . (13)
Based on the first-order condition, we derive the mapping between the moderation proba-
bility and the mixed strategy,
α (m) =
c− β (r1 − r0)
1− β (r1 − r0) . (14)
Lemma 3 For any α ∈ [αL, αH ], exerting effort with probability m can be sustained as an
equilibrium, where m is determined by (14).
A mixed strategy may arise as an equilibrium because of the externality of the benefit
from free-riding. Opportunistic types benefit from pooling with or free-riding dedicated types
when they do not exert effort and do not get moderated. However, as the number of free-
riders increases, the readers’ expectation of the pool decreases. As a result, opportunistic
types get less readership and less benefit from free-riding. If the benefit from free-riding is
greater than the net benefit from exerting effort, the number of free-riders will increase and
thus the benefit declines. Otherwise, the number of free-riders decreases and the benefit
from free-riding increases. In the equilibrium, the benefit from free-riding balances the net
7In fact, under moderation probability in this range, multiple equilibria exist. For example, it could
be that proportion w of opportunistic types stay with high reputation and exert effort and the rest of
opportunistic types stay with low reputation and exert no effort (notice all of them are indifferent in exerting
effort or not in equilibrium).
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benefit from exerting effort, which also determines the number of free-riders (the probability
that opportunistic types will exert effort).
In summary, we characterize the full equilibrium under different moderation probabilities
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Effort) The following describes an equilibrium: For α >
αH , opportunistic types exerting effort; For α < αL, opportunistic types exerting no effort;
For α ∈ [αL, αH ], opportunistic types exerting effort with probability m(α) (determined by
(14)).
Since different moderation arrangements provide different incentives for opportunistic
types to exert effort, moderation plays a critical role in determining the equilibrium expected
performance. When the moderation probabilities are the same for high and low reputations,
as we have discussed so far, the equilibrium expected performances associated with each
reputation appear in a uniform rank as summarized in the following proposition. This is in
contrast to the case with differentiated moderation probabilities, shown in the next section.
Proposition 2 In equilibria described above, the expected performance of high-reputation
commentators is higher than that of low-reputation commentators. Formally, r1 > r0.
This result looks very natural, since a high reputation is normally perceived as an indi-
cator of good performance. However, it is not trivial. In our case, the expected performance
of a reputation is essentially determined by the population composition (dedicated or op-
portunistic) under that reputation and the opportunistic types’ performance. (recall that
dedicated types perform at the same level under each reputation.) Notice that in each equi-
librium described above, opportunistic types exert the same level of effort under each reputa-
tion because of the symmetric incentive (which is due to the same moderation probability).
Therefore, the above proposition, in fact, says that the higher performance commentators
dominate in the high-reputation group more than in the low-reputation group.
3.4 Reputation Without Moderation
Reputation systems are used ubiquitously in online marketplaces and communities to pro-
vide information on users’ abilities and trustworthiness. In most cases, however, they are
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not combined with a moderation system. In this subsection, we compare the moderated rep-
utation system with a pure reputation system. Setting α = 0 reduces the above moderation
system into a pure reputation system.
Without moderation, the marginal benefit of exerting effort is from the increase in dis-
counted future payoff (β(v1−v0)) only, which is in contrast to the increase in both the current
period payoff and discounted future payoff in the case with moderation. The marginal cost
is c, as before, so compared to the case with moderation, the marginal benefit from exerting
effort diminishes while the marginal cost stays the same. As a result, we have
Corollary 1 The overall performance under a moderation system (α > 0) is (weakly) better
than that under a pure reputation system (α = 0).
The proposition indicates that moderation is generally desirable for better performance
in an online community, if the cost of moderation is zero or minimal. When the moderation
incurs considerable cost, the extent of moderation needs to balance the cost and the benefit.
Slashdot, for instance, employs a massively distributed moderation approach, in which all
eligible readers have the potential to be invited as moderators, voluntarily checking or au-
diting for the Slashdot community. Such a moderation arrangement provides a cost-effective
way to implement the moderation system in online communities.
4 Differentiated Moderation Probabilities
So far, we have taken for granted that the same moderation probability is applied to commen-
tators in both the high- and low-reputation categories. It is plausible that the community
may arrange different moderation schemes for each reputation group, since, after all, repu-
tation to some degree implies commentators’ types or effort. For example, the moderation
system may watch low-reputation commentators more carefully, considering that they per-
form poorly.
In this section, we study a more general case in which the moderation system moderates
comments from different reputations with different probabilities. We denote α1 (α0) as the
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moderation probability for high- (low-) reputation commentators. Replacing the moderation
probability α with the differentiated ones αi in the payoff function (3), we can get a similar
payoff function.
The basic tradeoff in commentators’ decisions remains the same, except that now we
have differentiated moderation probabilities. Similar to (4), the incentive to exert effort is
determined by αi + β(v1 − v0) − c, i ∈ {0, 1}. Because of the differentiated moderation
probabilities, unlike the previous case, opportunistic types may choose asymmetric effort in
equilibrium: They may choose to exert effort when they are in one reputation category and
choose not to do so when they are in the other reputation category.
We first consider the case α1 < α0, meaning the system watches low-reputation commen-
tators more closely and carefully. Similar to the case in which there is no discrimination in
moderation, we still can derive the upper bound and lower bound of the moderation prob-
ability to identify when opportunistic types do and do not exert effort. Notice that in the
current case, opportunistic types have asymmetric incentive to exert effort when possessing
different reputations. In particular, low-reputation opportunistic types have more incentive
to exert effort, since they are more likely to get early moderation.
We are more interested in the case where opportunistic types may adopt different strate-
gies under different reputations. In general, more moderation gives commentators more
incentive to exert effort. Given the moderation probabilities α1 < α0, it may arise as an equi-
librium that opportunistic types exert no effort when possessing high reputations, whereas
(some) opportunistic types exert effort when possessing low reputations. We assume a pro-
portion w (w ≤ 1/2) of opportunistic types has high reputations and a proportion 1 − w
has low reputations, and the number of opportunistic types with each reputation is invariant
over time. Under such a scenario, it must be the case that low-reputation opportunistic
types exert effort with probability w
1−w to make the number of opportunistic types in high
reputation stable. The expected success rate can be formulated as
r1(w) =
µss
µs+ (1− µ)w, (15)
r0(w) =
µ (1− s) s+ (1− µ)w
µ (1− s) + (1− µ) (1− w) . (16)
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Figure 1: Equilibria under α1 < α0
We denote
H(α0|w) ≡ β[r1 (w)− (1− α0) r0(w)] + α0 − c
βr1 (w)
. (17)
Such an equilibrium is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Reputation Oscillation) For any (α0, α1) with α1 < α0, if H(α0|0.5) ≤
α1 ≤ H(α0|0), the following is an equilibrium: In each period, a proportion w of opportunistic
types are in high reputation and exert no effort, and the other opportunistic types are in low
reputation and exert effort with probability w
1−w , where w is determined by H(α0|w) = α1.
The proposition predicts that the reputations of opportunistic types oscillate between
high and low: They build up high reputations when they are in low-reputation states, then
exploit the reputation when they are in high-reputation states.
As shown in Figure 1, α1 = H(α0|w) defines a line such that each pair of (α0, α1) on this
line can support reputation oscillation with w of opportunistic types in high reputations in
equilibrium.
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The condition α1 ≤ H(α0|0) is to make sure it is at least in some opportunistic types’
interest to exert effort. In fact, when α1 > H(α0|0), all opportunistic types stay at low
reputation and exert no effort (see the bottom left-hand corner in Figure 1). So, similar to
αL in the case with uniform moderation probabilities, α1 = H(α0|0) defines the boundary
condition beyond which no opportunistic types exert effort.
The condition H(α0|0.5) ≤ α1 needed here is only to ensure that the number of oppor-
tunistic types in high reputation is stable. Without this condition, the reputation oscillation
observed in equilibrium still holds. In fact, it is possible that in one period some oppor-
tunistic types have high reputations and exert no effort, and the rest of the opportunistic
types have low reputations and all exert effort; in the next period, those two groups switch
their roles, i.e., the high-reputation opportunistic types switch to low reputations and exert
effort, while the low-reputation ones switch to high reputations and exert no effort. We take
two groups of equal size as an example. Under such an equilibrium, the expected payoff
for a high reputation is v1 = (1− α1) r1(12) + βv0, and the expected payoff under a low
reputation is v0 = (1− α0) r0(12) + α0 − c + βv1. The incentive compatibility conditions
α1 + β(v1 − v0)− c < 0 and α0 + β(v1 − v0)− c > 0 require
α1 < min
{
H (α0|0.5) , (1 + β)α0 − βr1(0.5)H(α0|0.5)
1 + β − βr1(0.5)
}
. (18)
The following example illustrates that condition (18) can be easily satisfied.
Example 1 Let µ = s = 1/2, c = 1/4, and β = 4/5. According to (15) and (16), we can
calculate the expected performance r1(0.5) = 1/4 and r0(0.5) = 3/4. Suppose the modera-
tion system does not moderate high-reputation commentators and moderates low-reputation
commentators with probability 1/2 , i.e., α1 = 0 and α0 = 1/2. It is easy to verify that (18)
holds, which means the equilibrium described above can be sustained as an equilibrium under
the environment we specified.
The above discussion shows the importance of moderation. In general, moderation plays a
role in inducing opportunistic commentators’ effort, and the frequency of moderation impacts
opportunistic types’ incentives to exert effort. As shown above, when low-reputation types
are moderated more frequently, opportunistic types could optimally choose to exert more
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effort when they have low reputations than when they have high reputations. As a result, the
overall performance of low-reputation commentators may be even better than that of high-
reputation ones. The equilibrium captured by (18) is clearly an example: r0 is a weighted
average of s and 1 by (16), whereas r1 is a weighted average of s and 0 by (15), which implies
r0 > r1. For the equilibrium in Proposition 3, we have the following result.
Corollary 2 (Reversed Reputation) When the equilibrium w, determined by H(α0|w) =
α1 in Proposition 3, is greater than s/2, the expected performance of high-reputation com-
mentators is lower than that of low-reputation ones. Formally, r0(w) > r1(w).
In these scenarios, high reputation, in fact, means something “bad” (and in equilibrium
readers anticipate that). This is in sharp contrast to the standard reputation measure, where
high reputation is believed to be an indicator of high quality (in adverse selection settings) or
high effort (in moral hazard settings). Reputation under this moderation would be simply a
symbol with no definite meaning, which again highlights the significant impact of moderation
on online communities.
In a distributed moderation system as in Slashdot, moderators may have different prefer-
ences for checking high-reputation or low-reputation comments more frequently, as there is
no direct control on their preference. As a result, it may occur that, overall, the moderators
check the low reputation more often. In such instances, readers should be informed of such a
fact or be guided to read comments from low-reputation commentators first, since reputation
is a misleading indicator of comment quality.
Along a similar line, we can derive equilibria under moderation schemes with α1 > α0.
In these cases, high-reputation commentators have more incentive to exert effort. In an
equilibrium with proportion w of the opportunistic type in high reputation and exerting
effort,
r1(w) =
µss+ (1− µ)w
µs+ (1− µ)w , (19)
r0(w) =
µ(1− s)s
µ(1− s) + (1− µ)(1− w) . (20)
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Figure 2: Equilibria under α0 < α1
The incentive conditions require that high-reputation opportunistic commentators are in-
duced to exert effort while their low-reputation counterpart are not; formally,
β(v1 − v0) + α1 − c ≥ 0 and β(v1 − v0) + α0 − c ≤ 0. (21)
Unlike the case with more moderation on low reputation commentators, these incentive
conditions are loose in the sense that multiple solutions may exist for a given (α0, α1); in
other words, they may admit multiple equilibria. Intuitively, this is because a small portion
of opportunistic commentators switching from one reputation to the other may not cause a
change of the incentive structure. We next illustrate an equilibrium with binding incentive
condition for low-reputation commentators, i.e., β(v1 − v0) + α0 − c = 0. By substituting
ri(w) in, the incentive condition can be reorganized as
α1 =M(α0|w) ≡ −(1− β + βr0(w))α0 + c− β(r1(w)− r0(w))
β(1− r1(w)) . (22)
Similarly, α1 = M(α0|w) defines a line such that each pair of (α0, α1) on this line can
support an equilibrium with w of opportunistic types in high reputations (see Figure 2).
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When the moderation probability for high reputation is below a lower bound (M(α0|0)), no
opportunistic commentators exert effort; and when the moderation is above a upper bound
(M(α0|1)), all opportunistic commentators exert effort.
5 Optimal Moderation Allocation
When the community has adequate resources for moderation, it is always desirable to moder-
ate the comments as much as possible. For example, if the community has a total moderation
resource greater than the minimum moderation requirement needed to induce the highest
effort (αH , defined by (8)), moderating comments with equal probability regardless of the
commentators’ reputations can induce opportunistic types to exert effort.
In reality, however, resources for moderation are often limited and scarce, and moderation
is costly. So the community designer needs to balance the increased overall “system perfor-
mance” and the cost of doing so. In other words, the community designer faces a decision on
optimal moderation. We define the overall system performance as the average performance
from each reputation weighted by its respective population size, n1r1 + n0r0, where ni is
the number of commentators with reputation i. Such a definition does measure the overall
system performance, since it reflects the total size of the readership of a community. Also,
we assume the moderation cost is an increasing convex function of total moderation resource
(n1α1 + n0α0) and denote it as C(n1α1 + n0α0). Then the community designer’s objective
function can be formulated as
max
α1,α0
(n1r1 + n0r0)− C(n1α1 + n0α0) (23)
We are interested in whether the moderation system should moderate high-reputation
commentators more or low-reputation ones more. As mentioned earlier, for some given
(α1, α0), multiple equilibria may exist, which could make it difficult to compare the system
performance associated with each moderation scheme. To consider the optimal moderation
problem, we here choose the minimum equilibrium system performance as the comparison
criterion.
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Proposition 4 Considering the steady-state minimum-performance equilibrium, equally mod-
erating all commentators is superior to moderating high-reputation commentators more, and
moderating low reputation only is superior to any other moderation scheme that moderates
low-reputation commentators more.
When moderators pay more attention to high-reputation commentators, high-reputation
opportunistic types have more incentives to exert effort than their low-reputation counter-
part. In cases with some opportunistic types exerting effort, it must be that high-reputation
opportunistic types exert effort and low-reputation opportunistic types not. In these cases,
increasing moderation probability on low-reputation commentators (resulting in less freerid-
ing) lowers the value of staying at low reputation. In contrast, to lower the high-reputation
value, we need to reduce the moderation probability on high reputation, considering high-
reputation opportunistic types benefit from early moderation (by receiving maximum read-
ership). Therefore, properly increasing moderation on low reputation and decreasing that on
high reputation can keep opportunistic types’ incentives unchanged and thus keep the system
performance unchanged (recall the difference in reputation value influences commentators’
incentives). In some sense, moderation on high reputation and that on low reputation are
substitutes. This also explains why the slope of α1 =M(α0|w) is negative in Figure 2. The
above proposition shows the moderation on low reputation is a more effective one.
When moderators pay more attention to low-reputation commentators, high-reputation
opportunistic types have less incentive to exert effort and may free ride. Unlike the previous
case, reducing the moderation on high-reputation commentators here results in higher value
for them due to the increased chance of freeriding. Meanwhile, reducing the moderation on
low reputation can increase the value of staying at low reputation (consider the value from
exerting no effort since they are indifferent). Therefore, properly reducing moderation on
high reputation and reducing that on low reputation can keep opportunistic types’ incentives
unchanged and thus keep the system performance unchanged. So, the most cost effective
approach is to moderate low reputation at the minimum probability for a certain level
of performance. The lines α1 = H(α0|w) in Figure 1 illustrate such intuition: lowering
moderation probability on high reputations along these lines (to assume a same performance
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level) can lower moderation on low reputations; and thus the most cost effective way is to
not moderate high reputations at all.
The above proposition predicts that it is optimal to either moderate high and low repu-
tation with equal probabilities or moderate low reputation only. Numerical examples show
that it may be optimal to moderate low-reputation commentators only, instead of moderating
high and low reputation with equal probabilities.
Example 2 Let µ = 3/4, s = 2/3, c = 1/2, β = 4/5, and specify the cost function as
2(n1α1 + n0α0)
2. We can verify that simply moderating low reputation only with probability
1/2 can yield net value 0.55, whereas the best result with an equal moderation probability is
to moderate nobody, which yields net value 1/2.
In fact, the relative size of the dedicated type population to that of the opportunistic type
plays an important role in the choice of optimal moderation. When dedicated types are the
majority and most of them are in high reputation as in the above example, moderating high
reputation becomes very costly without much benefit, since those dedicated types contribute
anyway. In contrast, moderating low reputation is less costly due to the relatively small
population there, and properly imposing some moderation may motivate some opportunistic
types to exert effort.
Connecting the above observation to Propositions 3 and Corollary 2, we conclude that the
interesting and seemingly abnormal results on reputation oscillation and reversed reputation
can arise as an optimal solution.
In some special cases, the total moderation resource (say αT ) is exogenously given. In the
light of the cost function we discussed above, it can be interpreted as the moderation cost
is extremely high beyond a certain level. According to the above proposition, it is optimal
to either moderate commentators with equal probability (or, even moderation) or moderate
the low-reputation group only. If the moderation probability is low (lower than αL), even
moderation is unable to induce opportunistic types to exert effort. In contrast, if the same
moderation resource is applied to the low-reputation group, it may provide incentive to some
commentators in that group to exert effort. So we have the following result.
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Corollary 3 When the total moderation αT is exogeneously given and less than αL, moder-
ating low-reputation group only is optimal.
In general, when the moderation resource is limited, even allocation of the moderation
resource dilutes the moderation frequency and thus dilutes opportunistic types’ incentive
to exert effort. As a result, opportunistic types may exert no effort in either reputation
category. In contrast, by concentrating the resources on one reputation category, it may
provide enough incentive for the opportunistic types with that reputation to exert effort
because of the increased current-stage payoff.
In distributed moderation systems like that in Slashdot, moderation is performed not by
a central moderator but by distributed ones, as mentioned earlier. In these instances, it is ad-
vised that system designers provide detailed moderation guidance for potential moderators.
For example, designers should tell them to focus more on high reputation, or the reverse.
Furthermore, the guidance should depend on components of the commentator population
and should be adjusted accordingly as the population changes.
It is worth noting that the system performance resulting from the optimal moderation
discussed above is generally different from “efficient” system performance. The former is
concerned about balancing the benefit and cost from the community designer’s perspective,
while the latter is from a social planner’s perspective concerned about balancing the social
value created (e.g., how much readers value the comments) and social cost incurred in gen-
erating those comments. Because of the hidden information regarding opportunistic types’
effort level and costly moderation, the optimal system performance level is less than the
efficient one in most cases.
6 Extensions and Discussion
So far, we have assumed that the moderation is perfect in the sense that it always correctly
judges comments, and that each comment is certainly moderated by the end of the period.
In general, relaxing these assumptions impacts opportunistic types’ incentives. However, the
intuition of our main results holds. In this section, we briefly discuss two cases by relaxing
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each of these two assumptions: imperfect moderation and probabilistic moderation.
6.1 Imperfect Moderation
In general, moderation cannot be perfect, because of, for example, the limit of moderators’
knowledge or even moderators’ operational mistakes. For illustration, we assume moderators
fairly judge a useful comment with probability p and always recognize worthless comments
as worthless. Then the payoff functions in (3) can be re-formulated as8
vi = max
e∈{0,1}
[αep+ (1− α) ri] + β [epv1 + (1− ep) v0]− ce, for i ∈ {0, 1}. (24)
Similar to (8) and (11), we can derive αH and αL under imperfect moderation as
αH =
c
p
− β (r1 − r0)
1− β (r1 − r0) , and αL =
c
p
− β (s− r0)
1− β (s− r0) , (25)
where ri, i ∈ {0, 1}, can be obtained in a similar way (see Appendix). We assume c < p.
Proposition 5 Both αH and αL decrease in p.
Moderation provides opportunistic types more incentive to exert effort, since otherwise
they could get caught and derive nothing but a low reputation for the next period. Intuitively,
as the quality of moderation increases, commentators are more motivated, since they are more
likely to be fairly judged. Notice αH measures the lower bound of moderation frequency to
induce opportunistic types’ effort exertion under both reputation values. So, under a higher
quality moderation, a relatively lower moderation frequency could achieve the same goal of
inducing effort. Similar intuition holds for the decrease of αL as p increases.
The above proposition implies that it is beneficial for communities to improve the qual-
ity of moderation. Moderators could make mistakes due to their knowledge limitations or
misunderstandings. In this sense, it is very critical to clearly state the community mission to
commentators and especially to moderators. For example, what is the purpose of the online
community? What kinds of comments (e.g., informative) are encouraged and what (e.g.,
8For simplicity, we continue to assume the verified worthless comments from early moderation get 0
readership, although some of those comments may be useful.
25
off-topic) are discouraged? Mis-moderation can also occur because moderators may have
their own agenda, e.g., a commercial purpose. For example, on Slashdot, most moderation
is performed by moderators who are randomly selected from the commentator pool. These
moderators could be opportunistic or strategic when they post comments. To deal with this,
Slashdot introduced a meta-moderation system, in which moderation may be judged as fair
or unfair. Implementing another level of moderation, meaning moderation on moderators,
is an effective way to insure the quality of moderation.
6.2 Probabilistic Moderation
We can also relax the assumption that each comment is certainly moderated by the end
of the period, by assuming instead that comments are moderated (by early moderation
or late moderation) with probability θ. In addition, conditional on being moderated, a
comment is moderated by early moderation with probability α as in the baseline model. If
a comment does not get moderated by the end of the period, the commentator’s reputation
stays unchanged. Then the payoff functions in (3) can be re-formulated accordingly. For
example,
v0 = max
e∈{0,1}
[θαe+ (1− θα) r0] + β [θev1 + (1− θe) v0]− ce. (26)
We can conduct the same analysis to obtain similar results as those in our baseline model.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the impact of a moderation system on the performance of
online communities. First, we considered even moderation probability for different reputa-
tions and found that moderation probabilities critically impact opportunistic commentators’
behavior. In particular, there is a lower bound on the moderation probability to induce
effort and an upper bound to induce no effort. If a reputation system without moderation
is viewed as a benchmark, we showed that the reputation system with moderation always
outperforms the benchmark system. Then, we studied a model with differentiated moder-
ation probabilities for different reputations, where we discovered reversed reputation and
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reputation oscillation. It was shown that agents in low-reputation category may exert more
effort than those in high-reputation category, and then they exploit their reputations when
they reach the high levels. As a result, the expected performance from the low-reputation
category is even better than that from the high-reputation one. Finally, we discussed the
optimal moderation resource allocation. We found that when moderation is costly, optimal
moderation involves moderating commentators with equal probability or moderating low-
reputation commentators only. We also illustrated that reputation oscillation and reversed
reputation can arise in equilibrium, even under the optimal moderation allocation.
Our study provides insights for online community governance. For the purpose of induc-
ing quality content, an online community should introduce a moderation system to monitor
commentator-generated content. Promotional chats are commonly observed over the Inter-
net (Mayzlin, 2006). Moderation not only effectively screens out this biased information,
but also regulates the advertisers or other commentators who otherwise would easily take
advantage of the anonymity in the communities. Also, it is worth noting that the frequency
of moderation is critical and should be properly chosen for better performance of the online
community. Especially when moderation resources are limited (e.g., in terms of personnel,
system capacity, and so on), resources should be directed toward users according to their
reputation; it is generally effective to start with moderating one group of users with the same
reputation.
Moderation has a potential to be applied to other fields. One direction is to cultivate an
online moderated article review process. Online research networks, such as Social Science
Research Network (SSRN), allow researchers to expose their working papers to the public.
However, SSRN does not provide a platform for users to comment and discuss on a piece
of work. The lack of such a functionality may be due to various reasons but one concern
is the quality of comments. Our study on the moderation system can offer some guidelines
for maintaining a quality research network, where researchers have incentive to provide their
quality comments.
The current study can be extended in several directions. First, it is sensible to introduce
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an adverse selection problem with opportunistic commentators. In general, opportunistic
commentators can differ in their hidden abilities to generate useful information. Such hidden
abilities are due to various factors, such as their knowledge level and the opportunity cost of
their effort/time needed. As a result, a simple reputation measure that only considers the
recent moderation outcome is insufficient, since the reputation is not only about the threat of
future punishment, but also involves learning about agents’ types. A model with an adverse
selection problem can be expected to offer more significant results. In addition, once a richer
reputation measure is introduced, the moderation scheme can then be further refined based
on agents’ reputation/history. How to tailor moderation for commentators with different
reputations is another question for future research.
Second, we can further consider that ownership of reputations can be shifted without
indication. As we mentioned earlier, one important feature of online communities is the
anonymity of users. Anonymity calls for reputation and/or moderation systems to regulate
users’ behavior. It also creates the more challenging issue of shift of reputations, which is
beyond the scope of this study on reputations. After all, in online communities, an ID is just
a symbol with some history, and we often do not know what happens behind these symbols.
Third, further empirical or experimental tests on our results remains to be considered
as interesting direction. We are currently developing a system using PHP (PHP Hypertext
Preprocessor), which is a cross-platform server-side programming language especially suited
for web development. To maximize re-usability, the system is divided into two parts, a
moderation system and a separate part containing contents. The moderation system is built
subject independent, and it provides general moderation functions via API (Application
Programming Interface) so that it can be applied to any environment.9 The content part
is built on top of the moderation system using the API. A completed system will provide a
template for implementing a moderation system, and it will also allow us to collect first-hand
data.
9Of course, many details need to be considered and are involved with information systems research. For
example, we need to specify how the system calculates reputation scores based on users’ past performance.
Fan et al. (2005) provides us a good framework to start with.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
In the equilibrium with effort, it is easy to see r1 > r0 = s. Similarly, in the equilibrium
with no effort, r1 = s > r0.
For the case where opportunistic types adopt a mixed strategy, notice the expected
performance is the weighted average of the success rate s and m. The ratio of weight for s to
m determines the value. We compare the weight ratios. If m > s, the expected performance
is increasing in the ratio of weigh for m to that for s. So, to conclude r1 > r0, it is sufficient
to show
(1− µ)mp
µsp
≥ (1− µ) (1−mp)
µ (1− sp) (27)
or m
s
> 1−mp
1−sp . The latter is clearly true. If m < s, similarly, we can derive r1 > r0. m = s is
a special case in which r1 = r0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Incentive conditions require that α1+β (v1 − v0)− c < 0 and α0+β (v1 − v0)− c = 0. Since
α1 < α0, we only need check the second condition. Notice that we have v1 = (1− α1) r1(w)+
βv0, and v0 = (1− α1) r0(w) + βv0. So incentive conditions lead to
(α0 − c) + β [(1− α1) r1(w)− (1− α0) r0(w)] = 0. (28)
Therefore,
α1 =
β[r1(w)− (1− α0) r0(w)] + α0 − c
βr1(w)
= H(α0|w) = 1− β (1− α0) r0(w)− α0 + c
βr1(w)
. (29)
Since r1(w) decreases in w and r0(w) increases in w, the right hand side is decreasing in
w. So, if H(α0|0.5) ≤ α1 ≤ H(α0|0), we can get a unique solution to α1 = H(α0|w).
A.3 Proof of Corollary 2
By simple algebra, the condition for r1(w) < r0(w) can reduce to µs
2 < 2µsw + (1− µ)w2,
or 2µsw + (1− µ)w2 − µs2 > 0. Clearly, 2w > s is a sufficient condition.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
First, the system performance (n1r1+n0r0) is determined by the proportion of opportunistic
types that exerts effort in equilibrium. In fact, if w is the proportion, n1r1+n0r0 = µs+(1−
µ)w. We next examine the minimum moderation resource required to achieve a proportion
w, or
min
α1,α0
(n1α1 + n0α0) (30)
For all (α0, α1) with α1 ≤ α0, we consider the case with w ≤ 1/2 here. For w = 0, the
minimum resource required is trivially 0. For any 0 < w ≤ 1/2, notice that the equilibrium
described in Proposition 3 simply implies that proportion w of opportunistic types exert
effort in equilibrium. So, α1 = H(α0|w) defines a line on which any pair (α0, α1) yields
the same proportion w. Substituting α1 = H(α0|w) into the above minimization problem,
we can easily verify that the coefficient of α0 is positive. Therefore, the optimal solution is
minimum α0 possible on α1 = H(α0|w). Given the positive slope of H(α0|w), the optimal
solution is α1 = 0 and α0 determined by 0 = H(α0|w). The other case with w > 1/2 can be
similarly analyzed, and the optimal solution is α1 = α0.
For all (α0, α1) with α1 ≥ α0, in an equilibrium with proportion w of the opportunistic
type in high reputation and exerting effort, v1 = (1 − α1)r1(w) + α1 − c + βv1 and v0 =
(1 − α0)r0(w) + βv0. Based on (19) and (20), by simple algebra we can show that either
(v1− v0) decreases in w or (v1− v0) first increases and then decreases in w. Considering the
minimum-performance equilibrium, we next show that a non-zero minimum proportion w0
implies the low reputation incentive condition in (21) binds, i.e., β(v1 − v0) + α0 − c = 0.
Suppose otherwise; that is β(v1 − v0) + α0 − c < 0 and β(v1 − v0) + α1 − c ≥ 0. In the case
that (v1− v0) decreases in w at (w0− ², w0), w0− ² can be supported as an equilibrium, and
that is smaller than w0, a contradiction. In the case (v1 − v0) increases in w at (w0 − ², w0),
if β(v1 − v0) + α1 − c > 0, w0 − ² can be supported as an equilibrium, and that is smaller
than w0, a contradiction; if β(v1− v0)+α1− c = 0, at w = 0 we have β(v1− v0)+αi− c < 0,
which means w = 0 can be sustained as an equilibrium, a contradiction. Therefore, we have
β(v1−v0)+α0− c = 0, which leads to α1 =M(α0|w) in (22). Then for w = 0, the minimum
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resource required is trivially 0. For any 0 < w ≤ 1, α1 = M(α0|w) define a line on which
any pair (α0, α1) yields the same proportion w. Substituting α1 = M(α0|w) into the above
minimization problem, clearly, the coefficient of α0 is
−(1−β+βr0(w))
β(1−r1(w)) n1 + n0. We can verify
this coefficient is negative, and thus the optimal solution is α0 = α1.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
We can re-organize αH as follows,
αH =
c
p
− β (r1 − r0)
1− β (r1 − r0) = 1−
1− c
p
1− β (r1 − r0) , (31)
where
r1 =
µsps+ (1− µ) p
µsp+ (1− µ) p , and r0 =
µ (1− sp) s+ (1− µ) (1− p)
µ (1− sp) + (1− µ) (1− p) . (32)
First, c
p
< 1 due to the assumption c < p. Notice that r0 is the weighted average of the
expected success rates s (from dedicated types) and 1 (from opportunistic types). So r0
increases in (1−µ)(1−p)
µ(1−sp) , the weight ratio of 1 and s. It is easy to show that
(1−µ)(1−p)
µ(1−sp) decreases
in p, so r0 decreases in p. Also, notice that r1 is independent of p. Then, for the second term
on the right hand side of (31), the numerator increases in p and the denominator decreases
in p, and thus it increases in p. So, aH decreases in p.
Similarly, we can show that αL is decreasing in p.
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